Captain Stanley Vejtasa, USN

CAPT. Stanley Vejtasa – by R Leonard

Designated Naval Aviator: 14 August 1939, Naval Aviator # 6020
Active Duty: 1 June 1938 to 1 July 1970
Total Flight Hours: 5,267
Carrier/Ship Landings:
– Fixed wing: 478
Approximate Flight Hours:
– Prop: 3,786
– Jet: 1,023
– Rotary: 22
– VF/VA: 4,240
– VR/VP: 123

Combat Tours:
VS-5, USS Yorktown (CV-5);
– Makin Island Raid (31 Jan. 1942);
– Lae and Salamaua Raid(10 Mar. 1942);
– Guadalcanal-Tulagi Raid (4 May 1942).
– Battle of the Coral Sea (7-8 May 1942);
VF-10 USS Enterprise (CV-6);
– Battle of Santa Cruz (25-26 Oct. 1942).
– Active in Guadalcanal area until April 1943

Aviation Commands:
CO, VF-97, August 1943 to April 1945
CAG-44, May 1945 to October 1945
CO, VF-17, October 1945 to June 1946
CO, VF-10A/VF-92, November 1947 to June 1949
CO, NAF China Lake, CA, April 1953 to April 1955
CO, USS Constellation (CVA-64), October 1962 to November 1963
ComFAirMiramar, August 1965 to September 1968

Combat Awards:
Navy Cross (3)
Legion of Merit
Bronze Star
Navy Commendation Medal
Presidential Unit Citation
Meritorious Service Medal

Duty Assignments
Flight Training, NAS Pensacola, FL — June 1938 to July 1939
Pilot, VS-5, USS Yorktown (CV-5) — August 1939 to May 1942
Pilot, VF-10 USS Enterprise (CV-6) — May 1942 to July 1943
CO, VF-97, NAS Atlantic City — August 1943 to April 1945
CAG-44 — May 1945 to October 1945
CO, VF-17, NAS Fallon/ NAS Brunswick — October 1945 to June 1946
General Line School, Newport, RI — July 1946 to May 1947
Navigator, USS Sicily (CV-118) — May 1947 to November 1947 .
CO, VF-10A/VF-92, USS Philippine Sea (CV-47) — November 1947 to January 1949
CO NAS Mojave/NLO, Edwards AFB — February 1949 to January 1951
Air Officer, USS Essex (CV-9) — January 1951 to April 1953
CO, NAF China Lake CA — April 1953 to April 1955
Operations Officer, Staff CarDiv 5 — April 1955 to July 1956
Senior Course, Naval War College, Newport, RI July 1956 to June 1957
BuOrd (Air Weapons Officer), Washington DC — June 1957 to March 1959
CO, USS Firedrake (AE-14) — March 1959 to August 1960
Operations Officer, Staff CinCPacFlt — August 1960 to October 1962
CO, USS Constellation (CVA-64) — October 1962 to November 1963
Office of CNO (Carrier Readiness), Washington, DC — November 1963 to August 1965
ComFAir Miramar, NAS Miramar, CA — August 1965 to September 1968
CoS, Com 11th Naval District, San Diego, CA — September 1968 to July 1970
Retired from active duty — July 1970

CAPT. Stanley Vejtasa – by MK2

Well from right here on the site:

Stanley W. Vejtasa
“Swede” set a record for Wildcat pilot by scoring seven victories in one mission. He started as an SBD pilot on the Yorktown, and shot down three Jap planes while flying with VS-5. Lt. Cdr. Flatley then recruited him into Fighting Squadron 42. With the passing of VF-42, Lieutenant Vejtasa served with VF-10, on the Enterprise. During the crucial Battle of Santa Cruz, on October 26,1942, the Enterprise and Hornet were repeatedly attacked by large numbers of Vals. The ‘Grim Reapers’ of VF-10 had their hands full. Leading the “Red Seven” division, Swede caught a string of Vals headed for the Hornet and quickly knocked down two of them, while his wingman got another. Then he turned his attention to some Kates just arriving from the Zuikaku. Dodging their fire as well as American AA, he downed five more of the low-flying torpedo planes. Out of ammunition, he could only watch as the Enterprise was then hit by two bombs.

But the ‘Big E’ didn’t sink, although 23 Wildcats and 10 pilots from the two carriers were lost defending them. The Battle of Santa Cruz was a draw, or perhaps a slight tactical victory for the Japanese. However, the Americans weren’t driven off Guadalcanal, and the 150 lost Japanese fliers couldn’t be replaced.

Sources:

Barrett Tillman, Wildcat Aces of World War 2, Osprey Publishing, 1995

CAPT. Stanley Vejtasa – by R Leonard

Except Jimmy Flatley DID NOT recruit Swede Vejtasa into VF-42. Vejtasa was never assigned to VF-42 and, in fact, he was not “recruited” into VF-10 for that matter either.

Swede Vejtasa was in Yorktown’s VS-5 when he received orders to VF-10 in the days immediately before the Battle of the Coral Sea. Flatley was aboard Yorktown as XO of VF-42 and at the same time received orders, also, to report to VF-10, as commanding officer. Receiving, also, orders to VF-10 were Vejtasa’s VS-5 squadronmate Fritz Faulkner and, over on Lexington, from VS-2, John Leppla; VB-2, Bobby Edwards; and ship’s company, Dave Pollock. After the Battle of the Coral Sea, with Lexington sunk and Yorktown damaged, the USN forces rendezvoused at Tongatabu.

While at Tongatabu, Flatley was detached from VF-42 and replaced by Lieut Vince McCormack. Vejtasa and Faulkner were detached from VS-5. The three of them joined the Lexington survivors for the trip to the west coast via transport, including the Lexington folks for destined for VF-10.

The sequence of events was described in Stanley Johnston’s, “The Grim Reapers”, EP Dutton and Co., 1943:

“A Marine orderly entered the ready room and told Flatley that Captain Elliott Buckmaster requested him to report to the Captain’s quarters. … Captain Buckmaster received him with a friendly nod, invited him to sit down, and handed Flatley the copy of a signal just now recorded. As Jim read it, a wide grin spread over his face. It was an order to take the first available transportation to the west coast, where he was to form and command a new fighter squadron, VF-10. It was a first class assignment.
“The captain congratulated him, and suggested that he had better pack quickly, get some breakfast, and transfer to the Neosho, which would cast off soon and take him at least part way home.
“Jim’s face fell at this advice. … he made his request quietly: ‘Captain, we are expecting a big battle. I would like to be allowed to remain and see it through. I could pick up transportation after it’s over. Surely you could use another pilot.’” (pgs 21 & 22)

“Back in the ready room he found two members of the scouting squadron, Lieutenant Stanley Vejtasa and Lieutenant Fritz Faulkner. Mightily excited, they informed him that they had just been ordered to transfer to the Neosho and report to the San Diego Naval Air Station, where they would become fighter pilots in VF-10. Their belongings already rested on the Neosho’s deck and they intended to follow after breakfast.
“When Faulkner and Vejtasa heard that Flatley was to be their new skipper and had requested to stay aboard for the battle, they insisted on remaining, too. Surely, Vejtasa argued, two experienced fliers shouldn’t be refused a chance to get a crack at the Japs.” (pg 22)

“Laughing, Jim had to promise he would make a similar request for them if his was granted. … An hour later … Buckmaster greeted Jim with one of his rare smiles. ‘I have made arrangements for you to stay with us, and I am glad to have you aboard,’ he said.
“Jim put in quickly: ‘Lieutenants Vejtasa and Faulkner also ask permission to see this thing through with the ship, sir.’
‘Well, all right. I see no reason why not, now that you’re remaining, because they can’t do much back there until you arrive.’” (pg 23)

“Eight days after the Coral Sea engagement, several ships of Admiral Fletcher’s carrier force were anchored at a small Pacific island. A hospital ship had taken several of the more serious battle casualties aboard, and the remaining wounded were comfortably bedded down in the hospital wards of two transports. The survivors of the Lexington had been distributed between the transports – that is, all except a few who had already been given other duties.
“Jim Flatley, Swede Vejtasa, and Fritz Faulkner had joined the Lex’s survivors on the homeward journey. . . . ” (pg 45)

“The crowded transports arrived at a West Coast port late one June day and it was 8:30 pm before the ships were warped alongside the piers. Next morning Jim Flatley sat down in the office assigned to him at the Naval Air Station and began the task of organizing the new squadron. Vejtasa and Faulkner reported, bringing with them Ensigns R.M. Vois and James Dowden. … Pollack, Leppla, and Edwards had been granted a months leave, as had all other Lex men. That left only five of the new squadron ready to begin work.” (pg 46).

That would seem to sum it up nicely. Swede Vejtasa never, say again, never, was assigned to VF-42.

The information posted earlier on Vejtasa’s assignments came directly from Vejtasa himself as written for the “Golden Eagles Chronolog,” which consists of biographical sketches written by the members themselves of the Association of Early and Pioneer Naval Aviators. This group is made up exclusively of Naval Aviators and each member must be nominated by an existing member based on the nominee’s contributions to Naval Aviation. The membership then votes a nominee up or down. A very select group of outstanding gents. There is no “Auxiliary,” there are no “Friends of,” only Naval Aviators, and only those considered by their peers to have had a significant and lasting contributions to Naval Aviation. And ‘significant contribution’ does not mean simply a good combat record. In the early 1980s there was a big push to get this sort of information from the membership, especially those who had served in WWII. You might note that there is no mention of VF-42.

On a more personal note, my father was a pilot in VF-42. He was Assistant Flight Officer under McCormack and when McCormack moved up to XO with Flatley’s detachment, moved up to Flight Officer. Flight Officers, among other duties, are the guys who make up the flight schedules and decide who flies with whom. I have some of the few remaining documents from that squadron (most everything went down on Yorktown at Midway), including rosters. I can assure you that Swede Vejtasa appears on none of them.

This “Flatley then recruited him into VF-42″ is an apparent misapplication of cause and effect.
Yes, Flatley was aboard Yorktown in VF-42.
Yes, Vejtasa was aboard the same ship in a different squadron, VS-5. and Yes, They both ended up in VF-10 with Flatley as the CO. So . . . therefore, Flatley somehow recruited Vejtasa into VF-42?

If Flatley had “recruited him into VF-42″ why is it that Vejtasa did all his Coral Sea flying in a VS-5 SBD?

No, Flatley did not bring Vejtasa into VF-42. Both (amongst others) were assigned to VF-10 in an ALNAV posted before the Battle of the Coral Sea. Both were detached from their respective squadrons after the Battle of the Coral Sea and proceeded by transport to San Diego and North Island NAS.

The later disestablishment of VF-42 on 23 June 1942 also had nothing to do with the process. When Yorktown returned to Pearl Harbor all of the VF-42 pilots except the CO Lieut Comdr Charles Fenton and the XO, the aforementioned McCormack, were verbally TAD’d to Lieut Comdr John Thach’s VF-3 where they made up 57% (16 of 28) of the pilots. Fenton and McCormack remained at Ewa Field as a squadron headquarters element. All VF-42 of the maintenance personnel remained aboard Yorktown as VF-42 personnel, but were responsible for servicing the VF-3 aircraft. VF-42 was the most experienced VF squadron in theater; with the exception of Thach and one other VF-3 pilot, Mach Tom Cheek, all the divisions and sections of VF-3 were led by VF-42 pilots. 63% of the pilots actually flying for VF-3 at Midway were TAD from VF-42. When the dust had settled, those VF-3 pilots who had been aboard Yorktown when she was abandoned, or who were plucked from the water, were transported back to Pearl Harbor by ship, most aboard USS Fulton. Those lucky enough to have been in the air after Yorktown suffered her damage from torpedo planes flew in from, mostly, Hornet and, maybe one or two, from Enterprise, as I recall, on 18 June. The VF-3-42 flight from Hornet separated into two groups with the VF-3 pilots flying into Kaneohe NAS and the VF-42 pilots to Ewa MCAS. I believe all the VFs from Enterprise went to Ewa. VF-42 lingered on for a few more days to arrange transportation and survivors leave, then closed up shop for good. When VF-42 was disestablished, Vejtasa had already been in VF-10 for 17 days. By the time VF-42 was disestablished, 35 days had passed since Vejtasa parted company with VS-5 and USS Yorktown.

Rich

CAPT. Stanley Vejtasa – by radical3d

Hi. Saw your post on the Swede just now. I actually spoke to him today during an interview for the History Channel and as he tells it he WAS personally recruited by Flatley for Vf-10. Also as he tells it he was just about to be transferred over to the Neosho when Buckmaster came down and asked him to stay as he expected action the next day. Swede was glad to stay. He went on to mention that the Neosho was sunk – the next day?) with nearly all hands. He is still, to this day, a little shaken by “the hand of fate” as he calls it. On a personal note, this is a great man who did a lot of damage to the Japanese in a very short amount of time. He helped sink the Shoho with a nicely placed bomb. The next day he defeated 3 Zero’s in a 1v3 situation while flying an SBD. This during a time when the Zero was still supreme in the Pacific and the Japanese pilots were at their peak. In my opinion one of the greatest feats in Military Aviation. At Santa Cruz he shot down 2 Vals and 5 Kates. Tex Hill told me that in his opinion Swede was the greatest Naval Aviator he ever knew.

CAPT. Stanley Vejtasa – by R Leonard

Please read posts carefully.

Note that I said that Vejtasa was not recruited into VF-42 as the poster prior to mine recounted from the incorrect information posted on this site. My father, a contemporary of Vejtasa (in fact they were both promoted to Lieutenant (jg) in November 1941), WAS assigned to VF-42, and flew F4Fs at Coral Sea. I have the VF-42 roster, in fact I have a 1 May 1942 roster of all officers, ships company and air group aboard Yorktown which clearly shows Lieut (jg) Vejtasa as being in VS-5 (7th ranking officer in squadron, after Lieut Comdr Burch and Lieut’s Ware, Stever, Caldwell, Woodhull, and Strong). Vejtasa never, say again, never, served in VF-42. The info I posted above on Captain Vejtasa’s career was taken directly from the entry written by Vejtasa, himself, in the “Golden Eagles Chronolog.” The Golden Eagles is more formally known as “The Early and Pioneer Naval Aviators Association” of which Vejtasa is an emeritus member, as was my father, Rear Admiral William N. Leonard, until his death last year. The “Chronolog” consists of autobiographical sketches by the membership. Membership is by invitation only upon nomination by an active member and voted upon by the membership.

While you are certainly fortunate to be able to speak with Captain Vejtasa, please do not think that you are possibly the only one ever to have done so, for you would be very much mistaken.

And as far as [i]anyone[/i] being recruited into VF-10, I believe that you need to research the concept of “orders” a little more. I’d wonder who used the word “recruit” first? You? Or Captain Vejtasa? It strikes me that you are making a classic enthusiast’s mistake, using certain words to get the answer you want to hear. All of which flies in the face of the historical record and the established means of assignment and orders generation and transmission. Vejtasa and Faulkner from VS-5 (and Pollock AAO, over on Lexington) all received orders to VF-10 at the same time. So, tell, me, how did Flatley “recruit” Vejtasa, or any these gents, into his squadron when orders arrived via on their respective ships via radio from BuNav? Squadrons were not a club, orders of assignment had to be issued from senior authority, and Flatley, with all due respect, then a very junior Lieutenant Commander, did not have the pull to dragoon pilots from squadrons other than that to which he was assigned into a new squadron. A Lieut Comdr at the far end of the spring 1942 Pacific pipeline was not in a position to tell BuNav who he wanted assigned to a squadron for which he had orders as prospective commander. And just what, pray tell, would have caused Flatley to “recruit” someone in another squadron, on a ship upon which he had only been aboard for a week, when he had his own squadron duties, preparing for combat, to attend? Frankly, only an Admiral had the clout to ask for someone specifically (for example, on the advice of his Ops Officer, Jimmy Thach, VADM McCain had my father transferred to his TF-38 staff from ComFAirWest in October 1944 – for that matter, McCain had specifically asked for Thach, as well) and even then, there were occasions when the BuNav, and later BuPers, answer was, “No.”

No, sorry, your interview not withstanding, that is not the way it worked, and anyone with even a passing acquaintance with the way personnel assignments and permanent changes of station are made can see that.

US versus German Aces

US aces/German aces: simple reason for the difference, by philip.marlowe

While reading the section about the German aces on this web-site, much to my surprise, I learned that some people seem to have problems to understand the difference between a war and a baseball game: Thus, for them: In war people get killed. After they have been killed, they are dead, D-E-A-D. Take a few minutes and think about the finality that’s in this word.

However, the very basic and simple reason, why American aces had not the slightest chance to reach as high numbers of air victories as German fighter pilots was:

LACK of TARGETS !!!

On a day with good flying weather in 1944, the western allied air forces flew something between 10,000 and 20,000 missions over western Europe, the Luftwaffe something between 300 and 800 !!! The extreme was the D-Day: Allied missions over Normandy: More than 15,000, Luftwaffe missions: 2 (sic !).

Even though, the German industry could maintain quite a high output of airplanes until the end of the war the Luftwaffe could not get as many into action due to lack of fuel and pilots.

The article here on this web-site likes to disqualify the Russian pilots, and use this as an explanation for the high numbers of air kills reached by German flyers:

A Russian pilot in 1941/42 may really have been bad trained compared to a Luftwaffe pilot, but a Russian pilot of 1943/44/45 had gone through a training which might not have been as good as the one of an American pilot, but which was for sure better than the training of a Luftwaffe pilot in 1944/45 – or the training of the poor Japanese flyers who participated in the “Turkey Shoot”. The AVERAGE Messerschmitt pilot in 1944 was not a guy like Erich Hartmann (who had by the way among his 352 air victories also seven USAAF P-51 Mustang – five April 1944 over Ploesti/Romania, two April 1945 over Czechia. He shot them down using his eastern front aircraft, his eastern front tactics, and his eastern front experience), but a poor and stupid 19 year old boy who had been indoctrinated with Nazi bullshit most of his life, and who had to fly his first mission after 6 month training, comprising about 60 flight hours in total, 20 of which were on the Messerschmitt. For comparison: An American Mustang pilot had about 450 hours in total, 150 of them on his combat plane (and was normally at least 22 or 23 years of age, and thus a lot more mature – a factor readers younger than 22 might neither understand nor believe).

Since the Messerschmitt was known to be a beast, especially while landing (due to it’s high wing area load and it’s narrow and weak landing gear), it is not very astonishing, that in 1944 the Luftwaffe lost about as many planes and pilots in flight accidents as in air combat.

So: If anybody likes to think that the successes of the Luftwaffe pilots on the Eastern front might have been against unskilled flyers, he should note, that most WW2 successes of American fighter pilots were definitely against unskilled flyers.

Furthermore, the same article stresses the mass factor: the Russians threw a lot of material in the fight and this was the reason why they were finally successful. True, mass was a big factor, but, hey, what did the Americans do? The ratio of fighter planes in the sky over Germany end of 1944/1945 was about hundred to one in favor of the USAAF !!! Anyway, this is the way it has to be done. If any political or military leader has the chance to sacrifice material instead of lives, it’s his duty to do so. If he has the chance to achieve an advantage by gaining numerical superiority, it’s again his duty to do so. War is not baseball – see above. The Americans won the air war over western Europe like any war was won: Not because the US fighter aces were better than the German ones (not saying they were worse), but

1. because the AVERAGE American fighter pilot was a lot better than his AVERAGE German counterpart, and

2. because they had by far higher number of planes and pilots available.

“God is always on the side of the stronger battalions! ” (Napoleon Bonaparte)

US versus German aces – by steve

Correct on lack of opportunity. You are also correct about 43-45 Russian pilots. They were good. In fact some German pilots said they were better than Americans. But this is only cause Americans were green when they entered Mediterranean in 43. I remember reading a comment by Heinz Bar. He said Americans were tougher than Brits as they would fight you all the way to the ground. That ought to cause a stir. I have not heard any other German pilots echo his statement.

Much has been made of 109 & ground loops. Some have stated 30 % of 109 losses were due to faulty landing gear. The real number is 5 %. & usually this occurred when tailwheel was not locked. The wheels were actually further apart than Spit wheels. I do agree, though that 109 gear should have been changed. Wide track is better, & would’ve allowed wing root guns.

I met a Mustang pilot who flew in pacific. He said he only had one enemy contact. He saw a Jack, & it saw him & shot straight up in a climb & the Mustang could not follow. So even pacific theater pilots had a lack of opportunity problem. Especially in latter half of war.

One other reason for high German kills in east was that Russian strategy was that aircraft were to support ground troops, & Russian planes did not have high altitude performance like German planes did. This enabled Germans to use dive & slash tactics to great effect. Barkhorn is an exception to this strategy. He said; the way to beat the enemy was to outturn him. Hartman was opposite. He was a dive & slash man.

Also some have said Germans did well because Russians had poor aircraft. True in early phase of conflict, but not from early 43 on. Lagg 7 was a great plane as was Yak 3 & Yak 9. Yak 3 could outturn & outmaneuver Spitfires.

Last comment. There were some German pilots who scored the same rate in Mediterranean as they did in Russia. Reinert was one of them, Bar another.

US versus German aces – on the RAF, by rushman

Just to further emphasis a point here…..The Americans DID NOT win the air war in western Europe!!!!!!!! The “ALLIES” did. Let’s not let patriotism get in the way of fact.

With regard to German/American kill rates, maybe the fact that the German pilots had also been at war for 2 years before the Americans eventually entered could have some influence on those kill rates also.
Surely pilots hardened after 2 years of air combat would be considered considerably more experienced that those just entering a war scenario?

The Luftwaffe pilots had gained experience against the Russians and the R.A.F and subsequently, the R.A.F had already won the battle of Britain before our pilots had even fired a bullet in anger.
So therefore it surely has to be understood that as the U.S entered the war the best combat ready pilots where flying over Britain, France (thou they weren’t French), Europe and the eastern block.
You surely cant be considered “experienced” until you’ve been shot at with live ammunition.

Kills per Mission – an article, by Twitch

For a long time after WW II the Luftwaffe pilots’ claims of huge numbers of enemy aircraft shot down in combat were suspect. The real answer is simpler than we think.

Many publications of past times openly disputed the many 100+ victories claimed by Luftwaffe aces. Since Britain’s James “Johnnie” Johnson had scored but 38 victories during the war on the Western Front along with American Richard Bong’s 40 in the Pacific Erich Hartmann’s 352 was thought to be Nazi propaganda. It was reasoned early on that the 100+ scores included damaged and probables given by a liberal system. Some even went so far as to say that the numbers were points awarded by some Luftwaffe scoring system.

It is puzzling that no one in the 1950s-60s was casting doubt on Japan’s aces’ scores. Saburo Sakai’s 64 and Hiroyoshi Nishizawa’s 103 were never questioned. Sakai’s book about his combat experiences, Samurai, vividly depicted most of these kills from his war time flight logs. It was reasoned that since aces that survived many years of the war against a numerically superior enemy would have ample opportunity to score. Japan’s pilots never rotated out of combat except for brief relaxation periods or hospital stays for wounds received. Of course there were figures claiming that the top 35 Luftwaffe scorers had amassed 6,848 kills where the Japanese aces seem modest by comparison. Partly due to the flammability of Japanese planes, not many aces survived to score more.

Allied pilots almost to a man were taken out of combat and posted to flight schools or given organizational duties after a certain number of missions were flown. Guys like Bong did fudge at times while on training flights in battle areas to shoot down aircraft that “threatened the flight.” If he’d been sent to non-combatant areas to train men he would have scored less, of course.

The Japanese and German pilots had no such luxury. Both systems in place in the 1930s aimed at producing a few excellent pilots. By contrast Allied thinking was to produce a lot of very good pilots and give them very good or excellent equipment. By rate of attrition the latter theory would triumph as more men were fed into the training systems. Japan and Germany seemed to count on a finite number of individuals with long, rigorous training bounded by very high goals.

So we know what worked to win the war. On the other hands these very circumstances allowed skilled aces to excel in scoring. Most of the high scorers flew and fought for several years. Sakai’s score was cut short when in mid-1942 he was severely wounded. He had over two years of recuperation. In Germany it was the same. Pilots were needed for as long as the war would last.

During WW I Germany’s von Richthofen’s 80 victories were not later questioned nor were Britain’s Billy Bishop’s’ 72. There were far fewer planes in the air at any time since far fewer even existed. Perhaps the ratio between the top scorers on each side was not relatively lopsided. At any rate the opportunity to encounter enemy aircraft was much lower than WW II. In WW I a rigorous two-part claim system dictated that the enemy aircraft be found on the ground after destruction and that the kill be witnessed by air or ground personnel. Obviously when ships crashed behind enemy lines confirmation was impossible. During the first three-fourths of the war the Germans were favored by the geography of things. By WW II a witness was still absolutely required for a claim to be awarded. German gun cameras were not widespread.

As we skip back to WW II we note that most Allied pilots flew 100-150 missions generally before being rotated to non-combatant duties. Dick Bong scored his 40 during 146 missions over 400 hours. Thunderbolt ace, Bob Johnson tallied 28 after just 91 missions. German pilots by luck and skill survived many more missions forced by the necessity of their country’s survival attempt.

American bomber crews were relegated to 25 missions for their tours before going home. The average plane and crew lasted just 15 missions before being shot down so the odds weren’t with them. But a growing number did make their 25 after long-range fighter escort became common.

Germany was fighting on two fronts early on. In the West several pilots excelled in the African desert against British and American enemies. A stand-out was Hans Marseille with 158 victories (151 NA- NorthArfica/7 in Battle of Britain WF- Western front) scored in 382 missions. But since we cannot determine on how many of these missions he or any pilot actually met enemy aircraft we must draw ratios from total missions flown and total victories produced. Before he struck the tail bailing out of his Bf 109G and died in September 1942 he’d been fighting for just two years. When the African campaign closed Marseille’s group JG 27 went to the Eastern Front. It stands to reason that he could have doubled the number there if he’d survived. The point is that many did survive.

Now we must confront the meat of the large claims. This was the state of affairs on the Russian Front itself. Most aces that ended up there had begun their scoring in the Battle of Britain, like Marseille, with a few even commencing in the Spanish Civil War. When the Luftwaffe entered the area it was easy pickings. This statement is not meant to diminish any ace’s score. Many American aces in Europe figured their counterparts in the Pacific had it easier with so many flammable Japanese planes to shoot at. Too many variables make serious comparison valid. But when German fighters and bombers opened up operations the Red Air Force was a sorry outfit. The quality of pilots and equipment was deplorable. Early Soviet aircraft were outdated, poorly armed and armored and had dubious maneuverability. Couple this with unskilled pilots and we have a formula for disaster. The formula was a windfall for Luftwaffe pilots however. Their onslaught resulted in escalating kill totals for pilots that were just “good” much less excellent. This was a target rich environment at first until the Red plane’s ranks were decimated. While things did not go as well in the long term on the ground the Luftwaffe rarely failed to stay ahead in the aerial kill to loss ratios. Stalin drew in his manufacturing facilities as a squid retracts its wounded tentacles. East of the Ural mountains plants were set up to manufacture weapons for the Soviet forces, which were out of range of Luftwaffe bombers.

With a full bore effort to modernize the Russian aircraft types better planes soon debuted to blunt the German war lance. Were they superior to Bf 109s and FW 190s? This opens an endless debate. Certainly they were produced in vast numbers as the Americans did their planes. Both the USA and USSR had immense natural resources within their national borders and exploited the fact. LaGGs, Yaks, Ilyushins and MiGs were assembled like so many Big Macs at the lunch rush. They swarmed en masse at the fronts to counter the Luftwaffe. But the elements of the big picture were still favoring the German ace. Relative to the time line of the war, the German aces were at the zenith of their strength. They enjoyed sufficient serviceable aircraft and spare parts and possessed the crucial ingredient- experience. It is quite detached to sit over half century hence and state that Luftwaffe aces rapidly escalated their scores. They did, but the intricate details of battles, living conditions and service of planes in the harsh conditions must be recognized. It was not a flight sim experience of safely knocking down several Russian planes a day. Much fighting was over and behind moving battle lines that dictated a sad end if a plane made a forced landing or a bail out was needed. The danger was present from the large numbers of Red fighters and the constant threat of anonymous ground fire.

As stated earlier, the typical American pilot was in a combat arena for usually about a year to make his tour. Missions were long and not scheduled every day so the opportunity to encounter enemies to shoot at were reduced. The defenders, on the other hand, had short defensive missions and often flew several sorties a day for years. In Russia even the offensive missions were of short duration due to the forward location of most combatant airfields in relation to the ground action. So, again, multiple missions could be flown in the span of a day. We can conclude that the Luftwaffe had their cake and ate it too with the best circumstances of encountering targets no matter how the war was going in the East or West.

So we are left with the math. How many kills did a pilot achieve versus the number of missions flown? This does not take into account any marksmanship or rounds expended per kill as most of this is unknown save for rare cases. We can develop a kill ratio by this method keeping in mind the wild card factor of missions flown where no contact was made. This is regrettable but necessary since those figures do not exist. Certain pilots probably have better KRs, Kill Ratios, than stated but we’ll never know.

The premier ace Erich Hartmann accumulated 352 K, kills, over a staggering 1,425 M, missions, and made his CD, combat debut, in October 1942 producing a KR of 4.05. All victories were EF, Eastern Front. Note that any ratio less that Hartmann’s 4.05 is better.

We divide the number of missions flown by the number of kills credited for our kill ratio. Hartmann got a kill on average every four missions. That’s our formula. See how some top, well-known Luftwaffe pilots rank:

Gerhard Barkhorn- 301 K, 1,104 M, CD 8/40, KR 3.67 EF
Gunther Rall- 275 K, 621 M, CD 1940, KR 2.26, 272 EF-3 WF
Otto Kittel- 267 K, 583 M, CD 10/41, KR 2.18, all EF
Walter Nowotny- 258 K, ??M, CD 2/41, KR ??, 255 EF- 3 WF
Wilhelm Batz- 237 K, 445 M, CD 12/42, KR 1.88, 232 EF- 3 WF
Erich Rudorffer- 222 K, 1,000+ M, CD 3/40, KR est. 4.50, 135 EF- 26 NA-60 WF
Heinz Baer- 220 K, 1,000+ M, CD 9/39, KR est. 4.54, 79 EF- 83 WF- 45 NA
Hans-Joachim Marseille- 158 K, 382 M, CD mid 1940, KR 2.42, 7 WF 151 NA
Werner Molders- 115 K, 300+ M, CD 1937, KR est. 2.61, 33 EF- 14 Spain- 68 WF
Adolf Galland- 104 K, 425 M, CD 1937, KR 4.09, WF

Night Fighters:
Heinz-Wolfgang Schnaufer- 121 K, 164 M, CD 4/42, KR 1.36, WF
Helmet Lent- 110 K (8 day), 300 est. M, CD 9/39, KR est.2.73, WF
Heinrich Prinz zu Sayn-Wittgenstein- 83 K, ?? M, CD 8/41, KR ?? 29 EF-

The total number of victories does not mean the KR was high. Many were actually better than Hartmann. He excelled due to high number of missions flown. Others with the best KRs had fewer kills and missions flown but scored better in the ratio. Here are the best showing kills and kill ratios only:

Gunter Scheel- 71 K, 0.99 KR
Werner Schroer- 114 K, 1.73 KR
Walter Loos- 38 K, 1.74 KR
Wilhelm Batz- 237 K, 1.88 KR
Heinrich Setz- 138 K, 1.99 KR
Wolf Ettel- 124 K, 2.02 KR
Otto Kittel- 267 K, 2.18 KR
Gunther Rall- 275 K, 2.26 KR
Gordon Gollob- 150 K, 2.27 KR
Anton Resch 91 K, 2.31 KR

Relative to kill ratio Marseille at 2.42 KR ranks 17th and Hartmann at 4.05 KR is only 70th with Galland at 4.09 KR being 72nd.

Only a handful of fighter pilots flew 1,000 or more sorties. Hartmann’s 1,425 is the highest found recorded. It seems to correlate that more missions equals more total kills with all else on a par. The best baseball players play in more games and have more at-bats to amass high totals. By the same token other players hit the ball in a higher ratio to times at bat but have played in less games so totals are lower. So it was in the Luftwaffe during World War II.

The few superb could not make up for the many average that were rushed through pilot training in Japan and Germany later on. Starting off the war with a “few good men” system never allowed them to balance things out. The few that excelled were highly talented and lucky either by surviving or being immersed in target rich arenas of combat.

The reader can be the judge of whether all these claims are valid. Over 200 aces claim 60 or more. We know that confirmation is not always 100%. All nation’s pilots have over estimated kills in heated battles. Some “probables” land and fly again. Some “damaged” crash and burn. The area where most of these victories occurred is Russia and numbers have never been honestly established nor have simple production figures for all aircraft come forth. It is natural that the closed society of Russia in WW II would not publish that they lost so many planes on such and such dates all the while boasting of high production amounts. Basically by not saying much they are actually saying, ‘” we built a lot of planes but didn’t lose that many.”

Luftwaffe Major Werner Mölder was the 1st ace to reach 100 victories. Major Gordon Gollob was the 1st to reach the 150 mark. Hermann Graf and Walter Nowotny were 1st to get 200 and 250 respectively. The 1st ace to score 300 was Erich Hartmann. He was the 1st and only to reach 350 and ended up as the world’s ace of aces with 352.

The man with the best average per sortie was Leutnant Güther Scheel who scored 71 kills in 70 missions. Emil Lang scored the most in a day with 18. But the distinction of the most on one mission goes to Erich Rudorffer with 13 on November 6, 1942 over Russia. While Erich Hartmann had the greatest score in the Eastern Front Hans-Joachim Marseille got the most against Western enemies with 158.

Due to the high number of missions flown and target rich environments 107 German aces scored 100 or more. At night 23 German aces scored 50 or more with the top night fighter ace being Heinz-Wolfgang Schnaufer at 121. All were multi-engine planes too.

Official Soviet figures state that over 36,000 IL-2s alone were built. Published figures for Yak, LaGG and others planes would make at least 100,000. Then with all the rest of the types we know of, a great many more aircraft were constructed. Is over 6,000 kills possible amongst the top 35 Luftwaffe aces against the Red Air Force? Absolutely.

combat sortie effectiveness, by R Leonard

There has to be some criteria besides just the gross number of credited victories.

Being in the performance statistics analysis end of government work, however, I would not have used missions per victory, though. I’d reverse it and victories per mission. And I’d take it one step further and use victories per combat or contact mission. That way no one gets penalized for missions spent merely boring holes in the sky.

If you were to look, for example, carrier aviators, sub-species – fighter pilots, one finds that there are a lot of missions/flights of the Combat Air Patrol variety where here’s the ace of the base tooling around, loaded for bear, and the bears don’t come out of their caves to play. Using just a flown mission as a measuring factor then, penalizes him and inflates the KR rating. Carrier fighter pilots tended to, and still do, fly many a CAP mission where the probability of enemy contact is absolutely Zero (no pun intended) yet the mission must be flown anyway.

In USN service, missions were generically called “Flights” and the subset of Flights, “Action Sorties”. A “Flight” meant a given aircraft was loaded up with gas, ammo and stores and sent off into the blue. An “Action Sortie” meant said aircraft, or any aircraft in its type task organization, made contact with enemy forces of any kind during a “Flight.” For example, if a four-plane division of fighters escorts some dive bombers and the dive bombers do their work whilst the fighters circle around overhead, then the dive bombers are counted as action sortie, but the fighters are not. If one enemy plane appears as the dive bombers are doing their mischief and one of the fighters shoots it down, then all four fighters get counted for action sorties and the shooter gets credit for the victory, theory being, any of the fighter pilots could have possibly engaged the enemy and even if they hadn’t, they were protecting the one who scored. Simply put, just boring holes in the sky doesn’t count as an action sortie. Real world, for example, my father flew about 270 of what one could call fighter sorties in WWII, i.e., loaded and ready for action in the air in a combat zone. The vast, vast majority of these were “Flights” with no combat action, mostly CAPs and escort missions. On four occasions, the Japanese happened to make an appearance in the same airspace in which he and his cohorts were operating; thus, out of the 270, he had a total of four air action sorties in which he shot down a total of six enemy aircraft. There were also two other action sorties involving strafing of enemy naval vessels. By your method, then his KR is something like 45.0. Using action sorties as the basis, though, his combat sortie effectiveness (CSE = victories/action sorties) is in the range of 1.0. By comparison with a more well known personage, there’s Lt. Cdr. Jimmy Thach, who flew goodness knows how many “flights,” and who happens to have flown a total of five sorties that involved contact with the enemy:

20 Feb 1942 – 1st sortie, F4F-3, CAP: credit for 0.5 G4M
20 Feb 1942 – 2nd sortie, F4F-3, CAP: credit for 2.5 G4M
10 Mar 1942 – 1 sortie, F4F-3, Lae-Salamaua Raid: strafing enemy shipping
4 Jun 1942 – 1st sortie, F4F-4, Midway, Strike CAP: credit for 3 A6M
4 Jun 1942 – 2nd sortie, F4F-4, CAP: credit for 1 B5N, plus 1 damaged

Total five action sorties, i.e., those with actual enemy contact, only four of which involved combat with enemy aircraft, total 7 credits His CSE then could be calculated as 1.4. Obviously, with CSE’s, the higher the number, the better.

So, looking at Hartmann (and folks who want to correct my numbers please feel free, my specialty is Pacific Naval Aviation so my working knowledge of European flyers and their numbers is somewhat – oh hell, is greatly – lacking), as I understand it, he had some 352 victories. These were in the course of some 1400 flights, of which about 850 or so could be considered action sorties. We can calculate his approximate CSE, then, as 352/850 or 0.4.

Your results may vary.

Please do not mistake me. I am not saying any one pilot is “better” than another. What I am saying is that there must be a way to statistically examine the record and establish bench marks beyond XYZ number of credits. It seems that as soon as folks start talking about gross numbers of victories the conversation rapidly degenerates into something like:

A: “My guy, Otto Hadstehdenbed, shot down 562 Klingons. That was what he was credited with, that’s what he got, end of story.

B: “Well, my guy, Sammy Snowflake, shot down 235 Romulans.

A: “No way Snowflake got all those kills. Those Klingons credited victories just for pulling the trigger. Can’t hold a candle to Hadstehdenbed . . . he really did shoot down all those Klingons, you know.

B: *eruption* “BS! He did not, no way anyone could have racked up a score like that!!!

A: *bigger eruption* ” Did too!!

And so on, and so on. Not a game I’m at all willing to play.

I think that using statistics to level out the operational differences is the way to go, but I suppose there would have to be some agreement as to how to go about it. My position is that the “action sortie” is the key to normalizing the data. The use of a gross number of “flights” or “missions,” not taking into account world-wide, service-wide, differences in operational tempos, in my opinion, distorts the final answer. Whether you divide victories by action sorties or divide action sorties by victories is neither here nor there as long as you always do it the same way. I tend toward the latter as the CSE calculation method just as a matter of personal preference.

ammunition expenditure, by Twitch

R Leonard- Certainly the optimum formula would be kills vs. number of missions with enemy contact but it is totally impossible to obtain anything like that other than on a very limited scale basis since one would have to go through every pilot’s log book.

People will always have favorite aces for sure. The guys that got 5 or more in a mission must rank high in some statistical way too. There’s just lots of ways to measure the great ones. Hans Marseille could make a case for kills vs. ammo rounds expended as consistently being the best since he used few rounds to bring ‘em down. But again, this is not feasible either since we don’t have all that info from every combat that took place. Dave McCampbell averaged 266 rounds per plane when he had his flight of nine. Throughout his career no one knows what his ratio of ammo use per kill was.

There’s just too much we don’t know besides total number of missions and victories. So the way you mentioned or this way is the only half way good ways there are to gauge things.

Saburo Sakai and Hiroshi Nishizawa, by Al Lowe

According to Henry Sakaida’s “Imperial Japanese Navy Aces 1937-45 – Osprey Aircraft of the Aces No. 22,” Saburo Sakai never claimed 64 victories. So far, Sakai never claimed any number of victories at the end of the war. The number 64 was a number that author Martin Caiden arrived at by his own method when he, Fred Saito and Saburo Sakai were putting Sakai’s book together. Henry Sakaida puts Sakai’s score at 60+. Also, Nishizawa did not have 103 Victories, never claimed 103 victories, and according to his last CO, Commander Harutoshi Okamoto, Nishizawa told him his score was 86.

I recommend Sakaida’s book for anyone interested in JNAAF aces. It puts some wild stories to rest, including many about Sadaaki Akamatsu. According to what Saburo Sakai told Henry Sakaida, Akamatsu, while a hard drinker, NEVER raced to his fighter from his favorite brothel dressed only in a robe and clogs. In other words, the story about him doing so, in Sakai’s book, was the heavy hand of Martin Caiden.

von Richthofen’s and Bishop’s scores, by Al Lowe

by Twitch

OK what about Akamatsu’s boasting when drinking he believed he’d downed about 120 E/A? Is that bogus too? If it was ME being co-written about ([i][/i]Samurai[i][/i])I sure wouldn’t have allowed stretching of truths if that is actually the case.

So far as I can find out, the boasting was real. So was the drinking. It was the story of his arrival in a jalopy that Sakai denies.

Regarding von Richthofen’s and Bishop’s scores. Both scores were questioned after the war. Richthofen’s was questioned mostly by RFC/RAF ace Taffy Jones. He avidly hated the Red Baron, and would disparage him in print whenever he got the chance. Bishop’s score came into question much later. If you go to billybishop.net, you can find a lot about it there.

Re: Richthofen, by Lucky

Much of the effort to verify or discount Richthofen’s claims was that he was heavily used by the Imperial German Government for propaganda purposes. In addition to parading him around they also produced a biography which he dictated but was actually written by a professional. However Richthofen had the rather macabre practice of landing and visiting the wrecks of the planes he downed, cutting off the plane’s numerical designation (or writing it down). Afterwards he had a custom silver cup engraved with this number as well as the name (s) of the downed airmen. He displayed all of his cups on a shelf which was moved to his family home after his death. However since his estate was located in present day Poland, after WW2 and the Russian occupation it was confiscated and to my knowledge it’s whereabouts or (or whether the collection even still exists) is unknown…at least as far as I’ve read. Richthofen was a disciple of Boelcke and as his master taught him, whenever possible dove out of the sun at his victims. Since he also had the habit of hunting in the early morning, the bulk of his kills occurred over German territory and were readily verified.

Another great pilot of the first world war, Raoul Lufbery shared the flying habits of Richthofen but this meant also doing his killing over German-controlled soil, thus his official record of kills is almost certainly vastly understated…something Lufbery was aware of at the time, but didn’t care…in fact this was probably the major distinction between Lufbery and Richthofen. Although the western allies had good reasons to attempt to belittle Richthofen’s accomplishments, he was well respected by the airmen of both sides. In fact upon learning of Richthofen’s death, a British pilot carried a memorial wreath and dropped it over Richthofen’s aerodrome. It is also true that whether the final tally of 80 kills is absolutely correct or not, the fact remains that nobody on either side came close to achieving his record, or disputes his honored place in the history of aerial combat.

Taffy Jones and WWI scores, by Al Lowe

Taffy Jones liked to vilify MvR because he just hated him. He seemed to hate just about anyone with a higher score than his late wingmate, Mick Mannock. That’s part of the reason he inflated Mannock’s score to 73, because he hated Bishop.

US versus German aces – by MK2

The reason the Luftwaffe scores where higher is because they had more opportunity but not exactly because of more targets (although that is true as well) but rather more missions.

USAAF Aces were rotated out after 60 (most of the time) Hartmann and Barkhorn flew over 1000 combat sorties. As an example, Robert Johnson had 27 in 60 missions, that puts him at a higher strike rate per mission than let’s say Erich Hartmann (I am not for a second suggesting Robert Johnson was a better Ace than Erich Hartmann, simply stating a fact). He simply was not allowed to fly 1000 combat sorties.

American versus British Requirements for Fighter Claims

RAF vs. USAAF kill criteria – by Twitch

How much more substantiation is there than photographic proof from gun camera film? When there were circumstances when the enemy aircraft destruction was delayed and the camera wasn’t on a witness was required. That’s what the Fighter Victory Credit Board used to determine confirmed from probables or damaged enemy aircraft.

The requirement was that any pilot responsible for an enemy aircraft being destroyed was given credit. Why would anyone not credit non-fired upon kills? The plane is destroyed! That thinking would tend to lead to saying that the pilot should have also been killed in order for a kill to be awarded. Certainly the pilot would continue to be a combatant and do damage using other aircraft. That is just weird logic to split hairs and specify that a plane must be “shot” down to count.

RAF vs. USAAF kill criteria – by JoeB

Having a dispute in a non-aviation forum with a Brit who claims USAAF pilot kill numbers were inflated. Nimrod says RAF criteria for a combat kill were more stringent, American pilot kills would only be counted half as many under Brit standards. In particular, he attacks Yeager because he scored two combat kills without firing a shot, enemy collision of two fighters were counted in his column.

Claim accuracy varied a lot for both the RAF and USAAF in WWII, certainly overlapping a lot. Formal verification procedure is one aspect of claim accuracy but not the only one, AF’s supposedly requiring absolute gun camera evidence could still overclaim a lot (Soviets used gun camera’s in Korea and overclaimed as much as 10:1). It’s the real tightness of the procedure, not what’s on paper or the existence of a gun camera. The only way to know is when the enemy’s real losses can be determined against specific claims and the ratio calculated.

Your “friend” might be speaking of late WWII ETO where USAAF and RAF claims were both relatively accurate. Some people who do know aviation history maintain the USAAF ones were less accurate than RAF, but it seems to me a topic on which the jury is still out, comprehensively tying together claims v. losses for that part of the way hasn’t been done in a published book AFAIK. Also the USAAF (ca. 1944) was involved in many more big furballs (over Germany), the RAF relatively inactive in daylight fighter air combat at that time (not inactive, *relatively* inactive). Big battles tend to yield less accurate claims. Ballpark though both claims were less than twice the real German losses, typically, sometimes much better than that. For example I’ve looked at US claims against the German jets, because there are good books on both sides; those claims are quite accurate, the Me-262 losses at least 3/4 of what the USAAF credited its pilots with. But some earlier ETO US claims substantially less accurate than that.

And at times earlier in the war both Brit and US claims were much more exaggerated, for example when fighting the Japanese in ’41-’42 (AF’s on the short end of the real exchange ratio to exaggerate claims more than ones who are winning). In that period 3:1 overclaim or more was typical, sometimes much worse, but again not consistently noticeably different between US and Brits AFAIK. Brit claims over France and in Med ca. 1941 were also often badly exaggerated, worse than in Battle of Britain.

Stuff like “maneuver kills” etc. is going to be statistically trivial, in the big picture; the main issue is limiting the cases where natural wishful thinking of pilots ends up as official “kills” (which the enemy’s records show, postwar, not to have been scored). Another note, all above is for *fighter* claims. US bomber claims were much more exaggerated than fighter claims, all countries’ were but the US had many more bombers in day combat than anybody else late in WWII; rough estimate in ETO official US bomber victories were 4* the real German losses.

over-claims in MTO, by cavszabo

It is generally accepted that WWII kills are exaggerated across the board. This is due to a number of reasons, mainly that the people involved were fighting, and had to concentrate on combat, not on complete follow-ups of shoot-downs. My area of study, the Royal Hungarian Air Force, and the MTO, shows clearly that the USAAF’s 15th and 9th Air Forces claims were so high that it would have meant they destroyed the entire 8 Fighter Corps of the Luftwaffe and the entire RHAF by July, 1944!!

The only way to really get it right is to get combat reports from all the sides involved, compare them, and get an estimate!

RAF was more stringent, by BlFlyer

I’m afraid your ‘friend’ is right, the RAF criteria was far more stringent than the USAAF. There is however a sound reason for this, the British command where literally fighting for their homeland and relied enormously on accurate figures in order to carry out that defense. The USAAF did not fit cameras as standard on fighters operating in the European theater because of politics: The heavy loses of the aircrews on the daylight bombing raids over Germany meant the US government were happy to accept inflated claims of shot-down enemy aircraft for public moral back home.

A good example of this was an engagement over the skies of France while escorting a bombing raid, a squadron of RAF Spitfires and squadron of USAF P-47′s intercepted a large gaggle of FW190′s. The combat reports for the whole RAF squadron were 3 FW190′s destroyed and a couple of damaged, one single P-47 pilot claimed 7 FW190′s destroyed alone. The Luftwaffe records showed three aircraft had been lost all to Spitfires with a further one destroyed due to damage. This report is well documented, including in “The Big Show”.

The differences in scoring methods between the allies caused a great deal of friction between the air commands, especially prior to D-Day, because if the USAAF figures were to be believed the entire Luftwaffe would have been wiped out, which couldn’t have been further from the truth.

The previous mention that the RAF was nearly inactive in the later days of the war is totally false. The RAF was the most dominant air force in the European theatre during this period with many more sorties flown than the Americans. Secondly, the Battle of Britain claims were verified by actual aircraft crashing over mainland Britain, in actual fact more German aircraft were shot down than actually counted by the RAF command due to damaged aircraft crashing in the English Channel.

RAF vs. USAAF kill criteria – by JoeB

1. I’m afraid your ‘friend’ is right, the RAF criteria was far more stringent than the USAAF. There is however a sound reason for this, the British command where literally fighting for their homeland and relied enormously on accurate figures in order to carry out that defense. The USAAF did not fit cameras as standard on fighters operating in the European theater because of politics: The heavy loses of the aircrews on the daylight bombing raids over Germany meant the US government were happy to accept inflated claims of shot-down enemy aircraft for public moral back home.

2. A good example of this was an engagement over the skies of France while escorting a bombing raid, a squadron of RAF Spitfires and squadron of USAF P-47′s intercepted a large gaggle of FW190′s. The combat reports for the whole RAF squadron were 3 FW190′s destroyed and a couple of damaged, one single P-47 pilot claimed 7 FW190′s destroyed alone. The Luftwaffe records showed three aircraft had been lost all to Spitfires with a further one destroyed due to damage. This report is well documented, including in “The Big Show”.

3. Several comments made by other posters in this thread need addressing: Firstly the mention that the RAF was nearly inactive in the later days of the war is totally false,

1. Brit and US fighter claims in WWII were both all over the map. Some were accurate, some very inaccurate. A single statement of highly accurate with some pseudo-political/moral reason of homeland defense is ridiculous. Check a larger sample of claims and use a variety of sources:

-Greece v the Germans and Italians: see Shores “Air War Over Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete”: Brit fighter claims badly exaggerated, several to one, especially against the Italians interestingly
-Early Pac War: again Shores “Bloody Shambles” in 2 vol. All Allied claims in that period were quite overstated, Brits, other CW, Dutch and US all fighting the same enemy, no noticeable distinction in claims accuracy again around 3-4 Allied claims for every real Japanese loss (the Japanese seriously overclaimed too, but were in fact still kicking ass on the Allies).
-Compare the US fighter claims to have shot down Me-262′s (in 44-45) in Hess “German Jets v the USAAF” with actual German losses in Foreman “Me-262 Combat Diary”. The US claims were around 75% accurate, very accurate by any WWII standard. RAF claims in this period seem to have been similar.

It’s so obviously wrong to say US fighters didn’t have gun cameras standard later ETO it’s hard to believe you’d say it. Do any technical reading about the planes, besides numerous published GC photo’s in books and even film camera clips (they sometimes carried those) you can see on the web. Anyway it’s doubtful gun camera’s were a major factor either way; the Germans used them and their claim accuracy stunk in 44-45 (whereas it was very good in some earlier periods when they didn’t have them); the Soviets used them in Korea and made around 8 claims per real kill.

You also seem to be conflating “daylight bombing raids” with fighter claims. USAAF *bombers* consistently overclaimed much more than Allied fighters, not USAAF fighters much more than RAF fighters. USAAF heavy bombers made total claims of the same order as USAAF fighters, and the bomber claims were published, but intelligence did not use them at face value, the typical multiplier there was 25% (v assuming 75% for fighter claims). In the de-nationalized comparison of the Pacific War, same is true: compare B-29 claims to real J fighter losses in Sakaida “B-29 Hunters”, then look at US fighter claims and J fighter losses in any of his books documenting both sides of those combats, considerable difference. The apples-apples question is *fighter* claims, no documentable consistent difference US and Brit over the whole war.

2. One example. what’s the date, what units? The US P-47 units were inexperience in 1943 and claims of inexperienced units tended to be more exaggerated.

3. The statement was: “RAF relatively inactive in daylight fighter air combat at that time (not inactive, *relatively* inactive)” which you have misquoted as “nearly inactive”. In fact for most of 1944-45 USAAF (8th and 15th AF) fighters could reach Germany, escorting bombers there, and that’s where the bulk of the German fighter force was at that time. So it’s just a fact they saw more intense fighter combat action, and in bigger furball fights where claims on both sides tended to be more overstated. The US 9th and 12th AF fighters, as well as Brit Tactical AF’s, saw relatively little action comparatively against German fighters in this period because there weren’t that many operating over Occupied Europe and Italy where they flew, by that time. In some periods (weeks after D-Day, Ardennes counteroffensive, and last days of war) there were bursts of fighter action, but the strategic AF fighters encountered heavy fighter opposition almost all the time. And the tactical AF combats tended to be squadron and flight scale, strategic ones group and multi group scale. Smaller combats yielded more accurate fighter claims for all AF’s in WWII.

Spitfire vs. Zero

Spitfire vs. Zero – by Anonymous

I think your memory serves well … the Spits DID get their clocks cleaned the first few times until they discovered the Zero could out-turn them. After that, they stayed at higher speeds and did OK, as I recall, though the Spitfires were not a major factor in the Pacific anywhere.

I suppose a real comparison would be difficult at this late date, but I feel the Spitfire would have been a very good mount versus the Zero if the pilot knew both the Spit and the Zero’s weaknesses. Certainly, the Spitfire’s armament was good and it was an excellent gun platform. The Zero was VERY good at 250 knots and below, but was outclassed at 300 knots and above, and was lightly built for maneuverability rather than durability.

Stay fast and kick butt if you fight a zero.

Conversely, the Zero pilots wanted nothing more than a classic 180 to 250 knot dogfight where THEY had all the advantage. I’d say in 1942 – 1943, the Japanese had better pilots in their theater than the Spitfire pilots. By late 1944 – 1945, the tides had turned and the Japanese pilots were green replacements flying an obsolescent mount.

Improvement for the Zero would have been much easier had higher horsepower engines been available in a size that would fit into the airframe. As it was, the Zero soldiered on with a low-power radial (never more than about 1,000 to 1,100 HP) while the Allied fighters had 1,500 to 2,000 HP engines. Late-model Spitfires had 2,100 HP Griffons in them. Tough to complete with twice the HP!

The Super-Zero was probably the Ki-100, a radial-engined version of the Ki-61 Hein. It was absolutely a top-class fighter, but arrived in too small numbers too late to really affect the outcome of the war. The Ki-84 Frank was ALSO a top-class fighter that could hold its own against any Allied fighter, P-51 included.

Wonder what would have happened if the Ki-84′s and Ki-100′s were available in 1943? Same for the Re-2005 in Italy and the Ta-152 series in Germany. Had they been available in significant numbers as little as one year earlier, the outcome might well have been affected enough to prolong the war or to force a settlement without defeat. Who can say?

On the Allied side, wonder what might have been if the Grumman F8F were available in 1943? Or the Sea Fury?

The what ifs are interesting to consider, but cannot be answered with any authority since they never happened. Might make a good novel … 7 31 2489 7.1060930052

Spitfire vs. Zero – by Greg_P

Here is an original WII report from Clive “Killer” Caldwell about this very subject:

Section 1: Fighter Tactics

Tactics of Japanese “Tony” Type Fighter
1. The 80th Fighter Squadron has twice encountered “Tony” type fighters in combat, both times in the vicinity of Bogadjin. The first time was on 21 Jul 43 and the second time was on 23 Jul 43.
2. From these experiences with this type fighter not much information has been brought to light. However, pilots have reported speeds up to 400 mph indicated air speed in this type fighter.
3. One pilot reported having followed one of this type fighter from eighteen thousand feet to sic or seven thousand feet. A shallow spane was maintained all the way with the P38 indicating 400 mph, and during this time the P38 was unable to gain on the enemy. At this time another P38, indicating close to 500 mph, spaned from above and succeeded in shooting the enemy plane down after a long accurate burst. Another indication of the speed of this type of fighter may be derived from combat on 21 Jul 43 when a P38 found the enemy fighter behind him. The P38 went into a shallow spane and was unable to lose the enemy when indicating 400 mph at low altitude. This “Tony” was finally chased away by another P38 who spaned from above firing a burst at long range.
4. In combat in this squadron there has been no indication as to the maneuverability of the enemy fighter. However, the “Tony” has, on one or two occasions, shown no inclination to get into a steep spane when that action would seem to be advantageous to him. In each case where P38s have been on the tail of a “Tony” the only action taken by the enemy has consisted of maintaining a gradual spane with speed building up to 400 mph.
5. There are further indications that the “Tony” is not as apt to catch fire as are the “Zeke” and “Oscar”. Although they have been shot down in flames in several cases, a long accurate burst was necessary to accomplish this destruction and they did not show a tendency to explode which has been characteristic of the Japanese fighter airplanes

Tactical Trials Between Japanese S.S.F. Type “0″ Mark II “Hap” and Spitfire V.C.
1. Comparative performance trials were not carried out at the time and these performance figures will be supplied at a later date.
2. Both aircraft were flown at normal combat weight minus belly tanks.
3. Brief Particulars of Hap:
a. Take-off run – 900′ using 2600 rpm and 30″ MP.
b. Approach speed, wheels and flaps fully down – 75 knots.
c. Stalling speed, landing condition – 53 knots.
d. Rated altitude – 16,000′.
e. Combat ceiling – 32,500′.
f. Maximum speed at rated altitude – 335 mph, 2600 rpm, 40″ MP.
g. Armament – 2 x 7.7 synchronized machine guns, 600 rounds per gun (Identical with Vickers). British .303 ammunition may be used – 2 x 20 mm cannons, 100 rounds per gun Identical to Oerlikon).
h. Figures shown in b, c, and f are approximate. Air speed indicator had not been calibrated.

4. Flying Characteristics of Hap
a. No tendency to swing in take off or landing. However, a tail wheel locking device was incorporated since the brakes were inoperative.
b. Short take off and landing runs.
c. Good visibility.
d. Stick loadings normally not light and increasing with speed. This is more evident with right stick.
e. Movement of elevator trim extremely stiff.
f. Rudder loading normal but tiring in climb due to absence of rudder trim.
g. Very stable stalling characteristics. No tendency to spin even in high speed stalls.
h. Extremely maneuverable at low speeds, rolling off the top of loops can be executed at 180 knots.
i. Boost gauge calibrated in centimeters.
j. Seating position cramped, rudder position to suit short legged pilots only.

Test No. 1 – Commencing at 17,000 feet:
1. Spitfire and Hap to approach head on and maneuver, without loss of altitude, until one aircraft gets on the other’s tail.

Result:
Both aircraft passed at about 50 yards. Spitfire executed steep climbing turn. Hap steep turned and was on Spitfire’s tail within 21/2 turns.
2. Hap on Spitfire’s Tail. Spitfire to complete 4 steep turns to left. Reform position and carry out 4 steep turns to right.
Result:
Hap was able to turn easily inside Spitfire. However, jinking was necessary to watch Spitfire and check on deflection allowance. Hap did not steep turn as easily to right as to left.
3. Spitfire on Hap’s Tail. Steep turns to left and right as in previous test.

Result:
Hap commenced steep turning at 220 mph IAS. Spitfire was unable to turn with Hap., either in left or right hand turns, for more than 3/4 turn by which time Spitfire was close to stall.
4. a. Hap on Spitfire’s Tail. Spitfire to perform loop.
b. Spitfire on Hap’s Tail. Hap to perform loop.

Result:
a. Spitfire commenced looping at 300 mph IAS with speed of 140 mph IAS on top. Hap had no trouble in following Spitfire.
b. Hap commenced lop at 220 knots IAS and completed two loops in succession. Spitfire endeavored to follow Hap and stalled at top of first loop and fell out. Hap finished on Spitfire’s tail.
5. Hap on Spitfire’s tail. Spitfire to shake Hap off.

Result:
Spitfire commenced evasive action by executing spaning aileron rolls to right. Hap had difficulty in following this maneuver and was unable to get into firing position. Spitfire then did a high speed vertical climbing turn which Hap was just able to follow. Hap was able to comfortably follow all other maneuvers which were not carried out above 250 mph.

Conclusion:
1. Hap considerably more maneuverable than Spitfire at low speeds.
2. Hap stalling speeds considerably lower than Spitfire.
3. Hap able to turn and loop in much smaller radius.
4. Hap able to carry out any aerobatic maneuver at a much lower speed than Spitfire, e.g., roll off the top of loop – Hap 205 mph, Spitfire 250 mph.
5. Hap experienced considerable difficulty in following Spitfire in High-G, High-Speed maneuvers, especially to right.
6. At medium and low levels Hap easily able to evade Spitfire and turn the tables.

Recommendations:

1. Do not attempt to dogfight the Hap, especially at low airspeeds.
2. If you have a height advantage, use excess speed obtained in your spaning attack to climb vertically thus retaining your height advantage.
3. High Speed – High G tactics will considerably alter the disparity in maneuverability.
4. Keep your speed high. Don’t stagger through the sky.

Test No. 2 – Commenced at 27,000 Feet:

The results obtained in Test No. 1 were confirmed and the following additional conclusions were reached.

1. Spitfire had an approximate advantage of 25 mph at 26,000 feet.
2. Spitfire had a slight advantage in rate of climb at 26,000 feet.
3. Spitfire initially gained speed slightly faster in a vertical spane.
4. The Spitfire’s advantage in 2 and 3 are not sufficient to evade the Hap’s fire.
5. At altitudes over 20,00 feet with a height advantage of approximately 3,000 – 4,000 feet, the Spitfire can spane and attack the Hap with impunity. The breakaway would be made in a vertical climb, thus maintaining height advantage.

Tests No. 3 and 4 – Commenced at 17,000 and 32,000 Feet Respectively:

1. No appreciable differences were noted at 17,000 and 27,000 feet.
2. A special Spitfire was used for these trials.
3. All maneuvers were carried out at high speed and high “G”.

Results:
Hap commenced tests on Spitfire’s tail:
1. In high speed flight, Spitfire was able to loop in a smaller radius. Hap pilot blacked out endeavoring to follow.
2. Spitfire carried 3 loops in succession at high speed and finished in firing position on Hap’s tail.
3. Spitfire carried out roll off top of loop. Hap was unable to follow in same radius and lost considerable distance.
4. Spitfire executed a series of high speed, tight spaning turns to right; Hap pilot unable to follow and was on verge of graying out.

5. Spitfire executed a 1/2 roll to right from 45

America’s Newest Ace

America’s newest ace – by Daves Warbirds

Who holds the title of “America’s newest ace”? Has any U.S. pilot become an ace since Vietnam? One of the reasons why I ask (besides personal curiosity) is that here in my local CAF group we have an ex-P-38 pilot named Jack Walker, who in the late 1990′s (1997 or 1999, I think) finally got the officially-recognized confirmation of his fifth WWII kill, making him “America’s newest ace”.

I was wondering if anyone has become an ace since then (either in modern combat or by belated recognition of prior victories).
– Dave

America’s newest ace – by Daves Warbirds

Saying that a kill doesn’t count because it wasn’t acknowledged at the time is ridiculous. What about all those people who earned medals (up to and including the CMH) for their actions during the war, but had to wait years for the paperwork or the testimonials to make it official? They still did their heroic deeds (whether or not it was acknowledged then), so they are still heroes no matter what. Jack Walker scored five kills during the war. That’s a fact. And now it’s officially recognized. Just because the recognition came belatedly doesn’t alter the fact that he accomplished a feat that only a small minority of pilots can claim. In my opinion, he’s earned the right to the title ‘ace’, same as any other ace.

America’s newest ace – by Al Lowe

While I think that ANYTIME a pilot gets his 5th victory recognized, he should be considered an ACE, I don’t think that should make him a “NEW ace.” The way I see it, he was an ace from whenever he shot down that 5th plane. It’s just there was a delay in his receiving the title.

To be a new ace, you’d have to get your 5th one yesterday, or today. So far as I know, our “newest” ace is Air Force pilot Steve Ritchie. Along with Randy Cunningham, they were the last two ace fighter pilots this country has seen.

Though I’m sure Israel has produced one or two since.

America’s newest ace – by Al Lowe

by “Anonymous”]We should stop trying to rewrite history. An ace made 40 years later is not an ace in my book.

The victories acknowledged during the conflict are all I’m interested in.

Just an opinion.

So it doesn’t matter to you if evidence becomes available AFTER the war that confirms someone’s claims? By that token, Boyington re-wrote history when he was released from the POW camp. He came back claiming 2 or 3 more kills, that as far as I know were awarded on his word alone.

Supposedly, one of Rickenbacker’s claims was confirmed 30+ years after the fact. And there’s been other corrections too.

Robert S. Johnson was thought for years to have 28 victories, even though he only claimed 27 himself. It turned out, through a USAF investigation that claims between him and another Johnson in 56 group had been switched. R.S. Johnson had been given credit for a double kill on a day when he hadn’t flown, and one of his claims was given to the other Johnson (the guy with the double kill). The air force corrected this, reducing R.S. Johnson’s record to 27 and increasing the other Johnson’s score by 1.

WWI Pilot Charles R. D’Olive had been on the threshold of acedom for 45 years when on June 18, 1963 the USAF confirmed one of his two unconfirmed claims to give him an “official” score of 5.

Things happen. That’s why there’s always research going on. In some cases, specially those of WWI, I doubt if we’ll see much hard evidence anymore that will cause anyone’s score to change. But I don’t think you should over look information just because it shows up after the conflict is over.

That seems rather close minded to me.

Libyan MiG-25s, by Al Lowe

by “Daryn”]Weren’t there a couple of Libyan MiG-25s shot down in the 80s by the U.S.? Don’t know the pilot(s), maybe one pilot got two, or was it more than one pilot?

I know that a flight of at least 2 F-14s were involved, and I believe the Libyan aircraft in Question were Sukhoi 17s, not MiG 25s.

In any event, there’s not been a “new” American Ace since Vietnam. I believe Capt. Steve Ritchie was the 2nd American, and 1st and only USAF ace out of Vietnam, assuming you don’t count the backseater guys.

America’s newest ace – by max_g_cunningham

Al, might be referring to the original “Gulf Of Sydra” incident, prompted by Gaddafi of Libya, claiming territorial jurisdiction in the Med, behind the legal internationally recognized off shore limits.

The late USN CMDR Kleeman was lead pilot among a crew of 4, an F14 element comprised of 2 aircraft that took out 2 Libyan SU series (basically the MiG21 with swing-wings) aircraft, at medium-short range.
That also goes down as the first swing wing, VS swing wing encounter that resulted in a downing.

The Incident was virtually repeated several years later, when again, a pair of F14s, “smoked” a couple more, I believe they were SU23s (sometimes referred to as the Soviet’s 2/3 scale F111 knockoff).

Certainly, it’s not a particularly big leap to surmise that some Israelis must have made Ace, in the early 80s, when the Syrians got massacred, ostensibly by F15s, to the tune of 80-0, an era which goes down in modern air combat legend.

Many of those victories are attributed to radar guided missiles, from F15s flying CAP, that connected not long after the Syrian’s got airborne. For security reasons, Israel never publicly heralds, or lauds their Aces.

I’m not sure, if any actually made ACE, but the Brits flying their Sea Harriers also racked up some air to air victories against Argentina, with a relatively small number of aircraft and pilots, in the Falklands war.

America’s newest ace – by Stony

The March 2004 issue of “World War II” magazine has an article on a P-51 pilot of the 352nd Fighter Group by the name of 1st Lt. Alden P. Rigby, who has just become America’s newest WWII ace by finally getting confirmation of his fifth kill. While the U.S. Air Force has yet to make it official, he has been given official ace status by the American Fighter Aces Association.

There is a great article in the most recent issue of the American Fighter Aces & Friends quarterly magazine that just came out this week. It gives a detailed account of Rigby’s kills along with other good information.

They were Mig-23′s – by max_g_cunningham

Why is it that the F14 is among so many enthusiasts contemporary favorites ?

Although it’s not as if we have any influence, many including myself still question, and second guess, the DOD’s decision to turn their back on any further F14 derivatives and development, in favor of the so-called “Super-Hornet.” Then there’s the billions of sunk costs poured into development of the F22.

Like the F14, The story of the F20 Tigershark is a similar legacy, of throwing away the baby, along with the bath water,,.

Here’s one for you to ponder, very hypothetical, but interesting.

What if ?
The NJ ANG had been equipped with F20s, as advocated by many a “poor slob, dumb nuts” enthusiasts, with the F20′s attributed “quick reaction time,” obviously the 1st would have struck, but, would have the 2nd, the 3rd, or 4th, of a series of brutally terrorist hijacked commercial airliners have made it all the way, unchecked, to the WTC New York, and the Pentagon, Washington, back when ?